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branches and sects of the Eastern, the Roman, and the Protestant branches of Christianity. For this ever to be accomplished, it will be necessary for all Christians to come to the point where they can accept something like the famous Quadrilateral of the Lambeth and Chicago conferences as a working basis of general organization. It will be necessary, on the other hand, for those Christians who delight to call themselves "Catholic" or "Orthodox" to cease to insist that any particular theory of the bishopric, the Church, or any particular interpretation of the creeds is necessary. Men who hold the scientific views of the twentieth century must be permitted to understand these things in a way consistent with their intellectual outlook, just as really as those who still occupy the intellectual standpoint of Thomas Aquinas, Radbertus, or of the Second Council of Nicæa. In a Church so constituted and so liberally conducted, the different types of Protestantism could be included as religious orders. Liberty could be accorded these orders for the type of worship that best ministers to the taste and temperament of its members; but there would be a sense of unity and oneness from the fact that all belong to the same Church. It seems to the reviewer that some such approach as this to the problem might in time be fruitful, but in view of the deep convictions of many that they and they only are right, he is aware that for a long time to come such a program has little chance of success. A long period of education in toleration is necessary. It will take a good deal of what James Russell Lowell once called "settin' up and wooin'" to bring such a program within the range of possibility.

GEORGE A. BARTON.

BRYN MAWR.

**MIND AND CONDUCT.** HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1919. Pp. x, 236. \$1.75.

This volume contains the Morse Lectures delivered at Union Theological Seminary in 1919. Dr. Marshall divides his argument into three parts. The first, on *The Correlation of Mind and Conduct*, contains chapters on "Consciousness and Behavior," "Instinct and Reason," and "The Self." The second, on *Some Implications of the Correlation*, deals with "Creativeness and Ideals" and "Freedom and Responsibility." The third, on *Guides to Conduct*, examines "Pleasure and Pain," "Happiness," and "Intuition and Reason," along the general lines with which students of philosophy have been made familiar in Dr. Marshall's previous books on *Pain*, *Pleasure*, and

*Aesthetics*, and on *Instinct and Reason*, just as the first part is based on his *Consciousness*. There are, lastly, two Appendices, on "The Causal Relation between Mind and Body," and on "Outer-World Objects."

Laboratory-psychologists, averse to all speculative flights and anxious only to keep their psychology within the sober limits of a natural science, will probably look askance at Dr. Marshall's book. But for students of human conduct who are not afraid of viewing man in a cosmic context there is much in these lectures to arrest attention. I would point especially to the following doctrines which are fundamental for Dr. Marshall's whole argument.

1. There is his outspoken panpsychism: "As a logical extension of our habitual mode of attribution of consciousness to animals by the interpretation of animal behavior, we are not only forced to grant some form of consciousness to all forms of living matter, but we are led to look upon the Universe as itself pulsating with psychic life" (p. 89). I must confess that Dr. Marshall's very brief argument in support of this position carries no conviction to my mind. The only promising way, it seems to me, of reaching the conclusion that the Universe is pulsating with psychic life, is not to stretch analogy far beyond the breaking point in a *descent* from man through animal and plant to inorganic matter, but to *ascend* from the human mind, or, to speak more precisely, to develop the metaphysical implications of knowledge, morality, and religion.

2. Not only is the Universe a single psychic life, but every self is part of that life and determined within it. "We perceive that in holding that our acts are governed by the laws of Nature, the mechanist is really stating that the acts of the self are such as force us to believe this self to be part and parcel of Nature. And this notion we have seen to be eminently satisfactory; first, because we cannot without dismay look upon ourselves as stray waifs in this vast Universe; and especially because it means that the interpretation of Nature must include the interpretation of consciousness" (p. 101). Thence Dr. Marshall derives his theory of freedom. The self is always free, for it acts always in accord with its own nature. There are not, and cannot be, any forces "external" to it, to the compulsion of which it is subject. For the self "must be what it is because of the whole situation in the great system of Nature, of which great system it is a minor part. . . . The conditions of this system are thus of the essence of its [the self's] nature" (pp. 102, 103). To put it quite simply: the self is free because, as a part of the Universe, it must be what it is. If this seems an outrageous verbalism, it is only

because Dr. Marshall does not go the whole length of the Spinozistic position which, in effect, he adopts. Instead of saying that to be free is to be what one must be, I wish he had said, with Spinoza, that to become free, or to achieve freedom, is to recognize, accept, nay *love*, this "must," which is the evidence of union with the All, *Deus sive Natura*. And as for Nature and consciousness, I should again reverse the method of the argument, and, instead of interpreting consciousness as a minor system in Nature, interpret Nature as one system in, or aspect of, the total world of our experience. Dr. Marshall, *malgré lui*, is in the fetters of Naturalism.

3. Concerning consciousness and self, Dr. Marshall advocates doctrines which the limits of his time compel him to expound and defend with tantalizing brevity. He clings to the distinction of consciousness as mental and behavior as physical, the familiar psychophysical parallelism reappearing as "the hypothesis of a thoroughgoing noetic and neururgic correspondence." In consciousness, elements attended to are distinguished as "presentations" from the "field of inattention," which latter Dr. Marshall identifies with the *self*. It follows that the self of any one moment is neither presented nor presentable. In self-consciousness, no doubt, we have a presented self, but this presentation is either the "image" of a past self or the "simulacrum" of the moment's real self. In either case, the presentation, or "empirical ego," is sufficiently like the unpresentable original, to make it possible for us to study the latter "by indirection" through its reflections in the former. Dr. Marshall is skating here over very thin ice, as every student of this problem of self-introspection will recognize. It would have been well if he had found time to discuss how to distinguish the presentation which is my empirical self from my other presentations, or how we can be sure that this presented ego is a sufficiently faithful likeness of the unpresented self to justify the description of the latter as "that undifferentiable mass of unemphatic elements within the whole of consciousness." It is to be noted in this connection that Dr. Marshall himself claims that the empirical ego changes so little from moment to moment as to beget the illusion of the unchanging identity of the self, and thus to *mask* the constant mutation of the real self.

4. This mutability of the real self is a fundamental point in Dr. Marshall's argument. He uses it to assert the "creativity" of the self, and, thence, "objective creativity" as a "general characteristic of Nature." At any rate, the self creates ideals of progress, purpose, and good, and in some measure effects their realization in Nature. Again, a creative self is "new and unique" at every moment,

and thence Dr. Marshall infers that all volitional acts are rational acts *at the moment of their occurrence*, and that, consequently, we never do actually err or sin. It is only from the point of view of a later self, in turn new and unique, that, retrospectively, we recognize that we *have* erred or sinned. In short, he sides with Socrates in holding that no one sins or errs willingly, *i.e.*, knowing what he does. This in turn, furnishes a basis for an exceedingly interesting distinction between responsibility, accountability, and guilt. This is, I think, the most original portion of the book, and well worthy of careful study.

In Part III, we may note as helpful the view that morality is a "process of experiment, of adaptive adventure" (p. 184), and that it must needs be exposed to frustrations. But there is a consolation for these. "If we could look upon Nature as a whole, we should see ourselves as elemental parts of it, whose frustrations, as we call them, are merely situations necessary to the continued existence of the organic unity of the whole of Nature" (p. 141). If we could! Happy those upon whom life does not put a strain greater than the faith in this tantalizing "If" is able to sustain.

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THE REFORMATION IN IRELAND. HENRY HOLLOWAY. Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. The Macmillan Co. 1919. Pp. 240. \$2.75.

A work on the Reformation in Ireland might almost rival the brevity of the famous chapter on Irish snakes, if by Reformation be meant any change in the thought and religion of the people. In this sense there was no spiritual revolution in Erin; the cult of the nation remained just the same after Luther that it was before him, only — if a bull may be pardoned in this connection — "more so." One need not draw the parallel with England, so rich in versions of the Bible, in prayer-books and tracts and a great Protestant literature, to be astonished at the barrenness of Irish religion. She produced no great Catholic doctors or saints — no Loyola, no Cajetan, no Neri, no Borromeo, no Canisius, no Xavier. Ireland had already begun to live in and on her past; without seeking fresh acquisitions she eked out her spiritual livelihood from the usufruct of her great age of religion, when Irish monks evangelized the world and Irish scholars disputed with Aquinas the palm of philosophy.

But though there was no Reformation in Ireland, there was a shadow of one, and it is this that Mr. Holloway now traces. It was